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Abstract Continuous learning from streaming data is among the most chal-
lenging topics in the contemporary machine learning. In this domain, learning
algorithms must not only be able to handle massive volumes of rapidly ar-
riving data, but also adapt themselves to potential emerging changes. The
phenomenon of the evolving nature of data streams is known as concept drift.
While there is a plethora of methods designed for detecting its occurrence,
all of them assume that the drift is connected with underlying changes in the
source of data. However, one must consider the possibility of a malicious in-
jection of false data that simulates a concept drift. This adversarial setting
assumes a poisoning attack that may be conducted in order to damage the
underlying classification system by forcing adaptation to false data. Existing
drift detectors are not capable of differentiating between real and adversar-
ial concept drift. In this paper, we propose a framework for robust concept
drift detection in the presence of adversarial and poisoning attacks. We intro-
duce the taxonomy for two types of adversarial concept drifts, as well as a
robust trainable drift detector. It is based on the augmented Restricted Boltz-
mann Machine with improved gradient computation and energy function. We
also introduce Relative Loss of Robustness – a novel measure for evaluating
the performance of concept drift detectors under poisoning attacks. Extensive
computational experiments, conducted on both fully and sparsely labeled data
streams, prove the high robustness and efficacy of the proposed drift detection
framework in adversarial scenarios.
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1 Introduction
Modern machine learning algorithms should not assume that they will deal
with finite, closed collections of data. Contemporary data sources generate
new information constantly and at a high speed. This combination of veloc-
ity and volume gave birth to the notion of data streams that constantly ex-
pand and flood the computing system (Bifet et al., 2019). Data stream cannot
be stored in memory and must be analyzed on the fly, without latency that
may reduce the responsiveness and lead to a bottleneck. Such characteristics
pose new challenges for machine learning algorithms. They need not only to
display a high predictive accuracy, but also be capable of fast incorporation
of new information, being computationally lightweight and responsive. The
recent COVID-19 pandemic is an example of such a scenario, where mod-
els needed to be updated daily, whenever new information become available
(Chatterjee et al., 2020). Due to the novelty of this disease and scarce access to
ground truth, any new confirmed data was extremely valuable and updating
the predictive model was of crucial importance. Efficient learning from data
streams calls for such algorithms that can incorporate new data without a
need for being retrained from scratch. Furthermore, algorithms dedicated to
data stream mining problems must take into account the possibility of dealing
with dynamic and non-stationary distributions (Ditzler et al., 2015). Proper-
ties of data may change over time, making previously trained model outdated
and forcing constant adaptation to changes. The ever-changing nature of data
streams is known as concept drift.
Concept drift can originate from the changes in underlying data genera-
tors (e.g., class distributions) or simply from having a lack of access to truly
stable and well-defined collections of instances (Lu et al., 2019). The former is
the most common case, where the problem under consideration is subject to
non-stationary changes and shifts in its nature. Recommendation systems are
excellent examples of such naturally occurring drifts, as the tastes of users may
change over time. An example of more rapid changes would include a sensor
network, where one of the sensors becomes suddenly damaged and the entire
system needs to adapt to the new situation (Liu et al., 2017). The latter case is
strongly connected with the problem of limited access to ground truth in data
streams (Masud et al., 2011). As we deal with constantly arriving instances,
it may be impossible to provide a label for every one of them. Therefore, this
becomes a problem of managing budget (how many instances can we afford
to analyze and label) and time (how quickly are we able to label selected
instances) (Lughofer, 2017). Here, concept drift can be seen as a byproduct
of the exploration-exploitation trade-off, where as we learn more about the
underlying distributions, we need to update the previous models accordingly
(Korycki and Krawczyk, 2017).
While there is a plethora of methods dedicated to explicit or implicit con-
cept drift detection, they all assume that the occurrence of the drift originates
purely in the underlying changes in data sources (Sethi and Kantardzic, 2018).
But what would happen if we considered the potential presence of a malicious
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party, aiming at attacking our data stream mining system (Biggio and Roli,
2018)? Adversarial learning in the presence of malicious data and poisoning at-
tacks recently gained a significant attention (Miller et al., 2020). However, this
area of research focuses on dealing with corrupted training/testing sets (Biggio
et al., 2012; Xiao et al., 2015) and handling potentially dangerous instances
present there (Umer et al., 2019). Creating artificial adversarial instances (Gao
et al., 2020) or using evasion (Mahloujifar et al., 2019) are considered as the
most efficient approaches. The adversarial learning set-up has rarely been dis-
cussed in the data stream context, where adversarial instances may be injected
into the stream at any point. One should consider the dangerous potential of
introducing adversarial concept drift into the stream. Such a fake change may
either lead to a premature and unnecessary adaptation to false changes, or
slow down the adaptation to the real concept drift. Analyzing the presence of
adversarial data and poisoning attack in the streaming setting is a challeng-
ing, yet important direction towards making modern machine learning systems
truly robust.
Goal of the paper. To develop concept drift detector capable of efficient
change detection, while being robust to adversarial and poisoning attacks that
inject fake concept drifts.
Summary of the content. In this paper, we propose a holistic analysis of
the adversarial concept drift problem, together with a robust framework for
handling poisoning attacks coming from data streams. We discuss the nature
of adversarial concept drift and introduce a taxonomy of different types of
possible attacks – based on poisoning instances or entire concepts. This al-
lows us to understand the nature of the problem and gives a foundation for
formulating a robust concept drift detector. We achieve this by introducing a
novel and trainable drift detector based on Restricted Boltzmann Machine. It
is capable of learning the compressed properties of the current state of stream
and using a reconstruction error to detect the presence of concept drifts. In
order to make it robust to adversarial and corrupted instances, we use a robust
online gradient descent approach, together with a dedicated energy function
used in our neural network. Finally, we introduce Relative Loss of Robustness
– a new measure for evaluating the robustness of concept drift detectors to
varying levels of adversarial instances injected into the data stream.
Main contributions. This paper offers the following contributions to the
field of learning from drifting data streams:
– Taxonomy of adversarial concept drifts: we discuss the potential na-
ture of poisoning attacks that may result in adversarial concept drift oc-
currence and their influence on drift detectors. We also formulate scenarios
that can be used to evaluate the robustness of an algorithm dedicated to
data stream mining.
– Robust concept drift detector: we introduce a novel drift detector
based on Restricted Boltzmann Machine that is augmented with robust
online gradient procedure and dedicated energy function to alleviate the
influence of poisoned instances on the detector.
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– Measure of robustness to adversarial drift: we propose Relative Loss
of Robustness, an aggregated measure used to analyze the effects of various
levels of adversarial drifts injected into the stream.
– Extensive experimental study: we evaluate the robustness of the pro-
posed and state-of-the-art drift detectors, using a carefully designed ex-
perimental test bed that involves fully and sparsely labeled data stream
benchmarks.
2 Data stream mining
Data stream is defined as a sequence < S1, S2, ..., Sn, ... >, where each ele-
ment Sj is a new instance. In this paper, we assume the (partially) supervised
learning scenario with classification task and thus we define each instance as
Sj ∼ pj(x1, · · · , xd, y) = pj(x, y), where pj(x, y) is a joint distribution of the
j-th instance, defined by a d-dimensional feature space and assigned to class
y. Each instance is independent and drawn randomly from a probability dis-
tribution Ψj(x, y).
Concept drift. When all instances come from the same distribution, we deal
with a stationary data stream. In real-world applications data very rarely falls
under stationary assumptions (Masegosa et al., 2020). It is more likely to
evolve over time and form temporary concepts, being subject to concept drift
(Lu et al., 2019). This phenomenon affects various aspects of a data stream
and thus can be analyzed from multiple perspectives. One cannot simply claim
that a stream is subject to the drift. It needs to be analyzed and understood
in order to be handled adequately to specific changes that occur (Goldenberg
and Webb, 2019, 2020). More precise approaches may help us achieving faster
and more accurate adaptation (Shaker and Hu¨llermeier, 2015). Let us now
discuss the major aspects of concept drift and its characteristics.
Influence on decision boundaries. Firstly, we need to take into account
how concept drift impacts the learned decision boundaries, distinguishing be-
tween real and virtual concept drifts (Oliveira et al., 2019). The former influ-
ences previously learned decision rules or classification boundaries, decreasing
their relevance for newly incoming instances. Real drift affects posterior proba-
bilities pj(y|x) and additionally may impact unconditional probability density
functions. It must be tackled as soon as it appears, since it impacts negatively
the underlying classifier. Virtual concept drift affects only the distribution of
features x over time:
p̂j(x) =
∑
y∈Y
pj(x, y), (1)
where Y is a set of possible values taken by Sj . While it seems less dangerous
than real concept drift, it cannot be ignored. Despite the fact that only the
values of features change, it may trigger false alarms and thus force unnecessary
and costly adaptations.
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Locality of changes. It is important to distinguish between global and local
concept drifts (Gama and Castillo, 2006). The former one affects the entire
stream, while the latter one affects only certain parts of it (e.g., regions of the
feature space, individual clusters of instances, or subsets of classes). Deter-
mining the locality of changes is of high importance, as rebuilding the entire
classification model may not be necessary. Instead, one may update only cer-
tain parts of the model or sub-models, leading to a more efficient adaptation.
Speed of changes. Here we distinguish between sudden, gradual, and incre-
mental concept drifts (Lu et al., 2019).
– Sudden concept drift is a case when instance distribution abruptly
changes with t-th example arriving from the stream:
pj(x, y) =
{
D0(x, y), if j < t
D1(x, y), if j ≥ t.
(2)
– Incremental concept drift is a case when we have a continuous progres-
sion from one concept to another (thus consisting of multiple intermediate
concepts in between), such that the distance from the old concept is in-
creasing, while the distance to the new concept is decreasing:
pj(x, y) =

D0(x, y), if j < t1
(1− αj)D0(x, y) + αjD1(x, y), if t1 ≤ j < t2
D1(x, y), if t2 ≤ j
(3)
where
αj =
j − t1
t2 − t1 . (4)
– Gradual concept drift is a case where instances arriving from the stream
oscillate between two distributions during the duration of the drift, with
the old concept appearing with decreasing frequency:
pj(x, y) =

D0(x, y), if j < t1
D0(x, y), if t1 ≤ j < t2 ∧ δ > αj
D1(x, y), if t1 ≤ j < t2 ∧ δ ≤ αj
D1(x, y), if t2 ≤ j,
(5)
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is a random variable.
Recurrence. In many scenarios it is possible that a previously seen concept
from k-th iteration may reappear Dj+1 = Dj−k over time (Sobolewski and
Wozniak, 2017). One may store models specialized in previously seen concepts
in order to speed up recovery rates after a known concept re-emerges (Guzy
and Wozniak, 2020).
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Presence of noise. Apart from concept drift, one may encounter other types
of changes in data. They are connected with the potential appearance of in-
correct information in the stream and known as blips or noise. The former
stands for singular random changes in a stream that should be ignored and
not mistaken for a concept drift. The latter stands for significant corruption
in the feature values or class labels and must be filtered out in order to avoid
feeding false (Krawczyk and Cano, 2018) or even adversarial information to
the classifier (Sethi and Kantardzic, 2018).
Feature drift. This is a type of change that happens when a subset of features
becomes, or stops to be, relevant to the learning task (Barddal et al., 2017).
Additionally, new features may emerge (thus extending the feature space),
while the old ones may cease to arrive.
Drift detectors. In order to be able to adapt to evolving data streams, clas-
sifiers must either have explicit information on when to update their model,
or use continuous learning to follow the progression of a stream. Concept drift
detectors are external tools that can be paired with any classifier and used
to monitor a state of the stream (de Barros and de Carvalho Santos, 2018).
Usually, this is based on tracking the error of the classifier (Pinage et al., 2020)
or measuring the statistical properties of data (Korycki and Krawczyk, 2019).
Drift detectors emit two-level signals. The warning signal means that changes
start to appear in the stream and recent instances should be stored in a ded-
icated buffer. This buffer is used to train a new classifier in the background.
The drift signal means that changes are significant enough to require adapta-
tion and the old classifier must be replaced with the new one trained on the
most recent buffer of data. This reduces the cost of adaptation by lowering the
number of times when we train the new classifier, but may be subject to costly
false alarms or missing changes appearing locally or on a smaller magnitude.
One of the first and most popular drift detectors is Drift Detection Method
(DDM) (Gama et al., 2004) that analyzes the standard deviation of errors
coming from the underlying classifier. DDM assumes that the increase in error
rates directly corresponds to changes in incoming data stream and thus can
be used to signal the presence of drift. This concept was extended by Early
Drift Detection Method (EDDM) (Baena-Garca et al., 2006) by replacing the
standard error deviation with a distance between two consecutive errors. This
makes EDDM more reactive to slower, gradual changes in the stream, at the
cost of losing sensitivity to sudden drifts. Reactive Drift Detection Method
(RDDM) (de Barros et al., 2017) is an improvement upon DDM that al-
lows detecting sudden and local changes under access to a reduced number
of instances. RDDM offers better sensitivity than DDM by implementing a
pruning mechanism for discarding outdated instances. Adaptive Windowing
(ADWIN) (Bifet and Gavalda`, 2007) is based on a dynamic sliding window
that adjusts its size according to the size of the stable concepts in the stream.
ADWIN stores two sub-windows for old and new concepts, detecting a drift
when mean values in these sub-windows differ more than a given threshold.
Statistical Test of Equal Proportions (STEPD) (Nishida and Yamauchi, 2007)
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also keeps two sub-window, but uses a statistical test with continuity cor-
rection to determine if instances in both windows originate from similar or
different distributions. Page-Hinkley Test (PHT) (Sebastia˜o and Fernandes,
2017) measures the current accuracy, as well as mean accuracy over a win-
dow of older instances. PHT computes cumulative and minimum differences
between those two values and compares them to a predefined threshold, assum-
ing that higher values of cumulative differences indicate increasing presence of
concept drift. Exponentially Weighted Moving Average for Concept Drift De-
tection (ECDD) (Ross et al., 2012) detects changes in the mean of sequences
of instances realized as random variables, without the need for a prior knowl-
edge about their mean and standard deviation. Sequential Drift (SEQDRIFT)
(Pears et al., 2014) can be seen as an improved version of ADWIN, where
the sub-window of instances from the old concept is obtained by a reservoir
sampling with a single-pass approach. Additionally, the comparison between
two windows is done using the Bernstein bound, alleviating the need for a
user-specified threshold. SEED Drift Detector (SEED) (Huang et al., 2014)
is another example of ADWIN extension, where the Hoeffding’s inequality
with Bonferroni correction is used as the threshold bound for comparing two
sub-windows. Furthermore, SEED compresses its sub-windows by eliminating
redundant instances from homogeneous parts of its windows. Drift Detection
Methods based on the Hoeffding’s bounds (HDDM) (Blanco et al., 2015) uses
the identical bound as SEED, but drops the idea of sub-windows and focuses
on measuring both false positive and false negative rates. Fast Hoeffding Drift
Detection Method (FHDDM) (Pesaranghader and Viktor, 2016) is yet another
drift detector utilizing the popular Hoeffding’s inequality, but its novelty lies
in measuring the probability of correct decisions returned by the underlying
classifier. Fisher Test Drift Detector (FTDD) (de Lima Cabral and de Bar-
ros, 2018) is an extension of STEPD that addressees the issue of sub-windows
being of insufficient size or holding imbalanced distributions. Wilcoxon Rank
Sum Test Drift Detector (WSTD) (de Barros et al., 2018) is another exten-
sion of STEPD that uses the Wilcoxon rank-sum statistical test for comparing
distributions in sub-windows. Diversity Measure as Drift Detection Method
(DMDDM) (Mahdi et al., 2020) uses a combination of a pairwise diversity
measure and PHT to offer an aggregated measure of difference between two
concepts.
Recently, we can see the emergence of the ensemble learning paradigm
applied to drift detectors (Krawczyk et al., 2017). Dynamic Classifier Selec-
tion with Local Accuracy and Drift Detector (DCS-LA+DDM) (Pinage et al.,
2020) uses an ensemble of base classifiers together with a single drift detec-
tor. However, while based on ensemble idea, one cannot consider it a true
ensemble of drift detectors. Drift Detection Ensemble (DDE) (Maciel et al.,
2015) uses a combination of three independent drift detectors, which can be
seen as a heterogeneous ensemble drift detector. Stacking Fast Hoeffding Drift
Detection Method (FHDDMS) (Pesaranghader et al., 2018) uses a sequential
combination of FHDDM detectors. Ensemble Drift Detection with Feature
Subspaces (EDFS) (Korycki and Krawczyk, 2019) uses a combination of in-
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cremental Kolmogorov-Smirnov detectors (dos Reis et al., 2016) deployed on a
set of diverse feature subspaces. Every time drift is detected, the subspaces are
reconstructed, allowing EDFS to capture the new data characteristics. EDFS
can be seen as a homogeneous ensemble drift detector.
Classifiers for drifting data streams. Alternative approaches assume us-
ing classifiers that are capable of learning in an incremental or online manner.
Sliding windows storing only the most recent instances are very popular, al-
lowing for natural forgetting of older instances (Ramı´rez-Gallego et al., 2017;
Roseberry et al., 2019). The size of the window is an important parameter and
adapting it over time seems to yield the best results (Bifet and Gavalda`, 2007).
Online learners are capable of learning instance by instance, discarding data
after it passed the training procedure. They are very efficient on their own,
but need to be equipped with a forgetting mechanism in order not to endlessly
grow their complexity (Yu and Webb, 2019). Adaptive Hoeffding Trees (Bifet
and Gavalda`, 2009) and gradient-based methods (Jothimurugesan et al., 2018)
are among the most popular solutions.
Ensemble approaches. Combining multiple classifiers is a very popular and
powerful approach for standard learning problems (Wozniak et al., 2014). The
technique transferred seamlessly to data stream mining scenarios, where en-
semble approaches have displayed a great efficacy (Krawczyk et al., 2017).
They not only offer improved predictive power, robustness, and reduction of
variance, but also can easily handle concept drift and use it as a natural way of
maintaining diversity. By encapsulating new knowledge in the ensemble pool
and removing outdated models, one can assure that the base classifiers are con-
tinuously mutually complementary, while adapting to changes in the stream.
Popular solutions are based on the usage of online versions of bagging (Bifet
et al., 2010b), boosting (Oza and Russell, 2001), Random Forest (Gomes et al.,
2017), or instance-based clustering (Korycki and Krawczyk, 2018), as well as
dedicated architectures such as Accuracy Updated Ensemble (Brzezinski and
Stefanowski, 2014) or Kappa Updated Ensemble (Cano and Krawczyk, 2020).
3 Adversarial concept drift and poisoning attacks in streaming
scenarios
In this section, we will discuss: the unique characteristic of adversarial learning
scenario in the context of drifting data streams, the inadequacy of existing
detectors for handling adversarial instances, why adversarial drift cannot be
simply disregarded as a noise, how it impacts the learning from data streams,
and what type of poisoning attacks we may expect.
Adversarial learning for static data. With the advent of deep learning and
numerous success stories of its application in real-life problems, researchers
started to notice that deep models can be easily affected by corrupted or noisy
information (Elsayed et al., 2018). Multiple studies reported that even small
perturbations in the training data may have devastating effects on the effi-
cacy of the neural model (Su et al., 2019). While learning in the presence of
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noisy instances (either in a form of feature noise (Adeli et al., 2019) or label
noise (Fre´nay and Verleysen, 2014)) has been studied thoroughly in machine
learning, the specifics of deep learning gave a rise to novel challenges (Wang
et al., 2020). As deep learning usually deals with complex representations of
data, such as images (Dong et al., 2020) or text (Wallace et al., 2019), noise
can be introduced in various new forms and affect multiple types of outputs
generated by deep models: predictions, extracted features, embeddings, or gen-
erated instances (Choi et al., 2018). Adversarial learning is nowadays used in
the broad context of preparing models to deal with noisy and corrupted data
(Zhang et al., 2016), ether by evasion (Li and Li, 2020) or poisoning attack
(Bojchevski and Gu¨nnemann, 2019) training schemes. It is important to note
that in the literature the term adversarial learning is used for both scenarios
with a malicious party attacking the model (Madry et al., 2018) and scenarios
where corrupted information is the effect of environmental factors (Kaneko
and Harada, 2020). As for the effect on data, it is either assumed that the
training set is already corrupted (Cohen et al., 2020), or that the corruption
may appear during the prediction phase and thus the training set must be
enriched in order to prepare the model (Xiao et al., 2018).
Unique characteristics of adversarial learning in data streams. Works
in adversarial learning assume the static nature of data and the fact that
the true nature of classes is known beforehand. Therefore, one may generate
instances that differ from the training data in order to predict the nature of
noisy or corrupted instances. In this work, we propose to extend the concept of
adversarial learning into the data stream scenario with concept drift presence.
This poses massive new challenges for the learning algorithms that cannot
be tackled by the existing adversarial models. Let us now discuss the unique
challenges that are present in the adversarial set-up of learning from data
streams.
– The true state of classes is subject to change over time. Data
streams are subject to change over time. Therefore, what could be con-
sidered an adversarial case, may become a valid instance from a drifted
distribution. This prevents us from simply enhancing the training set with
artificial adversarial instances, as we cannot know a priori if any changes in
the stream originate from the actual drift presence or from an adversarial
attack.
– Adversarial concept drift should be treated as malicious. In order
to inject an adversarial concept drift into data, an attacker must be aware
of the nature of data. Through this work, we will consider a scenario with
a malicious party providing corrupted, poisoned data with a clear aim of
damaging and harming our learning system. Similarities to insider attacks
(Tuor et al., 2017) can be drawn, as in both cases poisoning data is prepared
in such a way that eludes clear early detection as outliers and damages the
learning system over time.
– Need to differentiate between valid and adversarial concept drift.
We must always assume that the analyzed stream may be subject to a
10  Lukasz Korycki, Bartosz Krawczyk†
valid, non-malicious concept drift. This poses a very interesting challenge
- how can we differentiate between the changes that we want to follow and
changes that may be of adversarial nature? Here, we should assume that
concept drift will become more and more present as the stream progresses,
while adversarial attacks may have a periodic nature and usually constitute
only a small portion of the incoming instances. It is highly unlikely that
we will have equal proportions of valid and adversarial instances in the
stream.
– Robustness to adversarial data cannot hinder the adaptation pro-
cess. While designing robust machine learning algorithms for adversarial
concept drift, we cannot follow the standard procedure that treats all data
different from the training set as adversarial ones. A robust learner that
treats all new data distributions as corrupted will not be able to adapt to
new concepts. We need to design novel algorithms capable of differentiating
between valid and adversarial drifts, which in turn will be used to make
autonomous and on-the-fly decisions whether the learner should adapt to
new data or not. Therefore, we find creating robust concept drift detectors
particularly promising direction.
Limitations of existing drift detectors. State-of-the-art drift detectors,
discussed in details in Section 2, share common principles. They all monitor
some characteristics of newly arriving instances from the data stream and use
various thresholds to decide if the new data are different enough to signal con-
cept drift presence. It is easy to notice that the used measures and statistical
tests are very sensitive to any perturbations in data and offer no robustness
to poisoning attacks. Existing drift detectors concentrate on checking the level
of difference between two distributions, without actually analyzing the con-
tent of the newly arriving instances. Furthermore, they are realized as simple
thresholding modules, not being able to adapt themselves to data at hand.
This calls for new drift detectors that have enhanced robustness and can learn
properties of data, instead of just measuring some simple statistics.
Noisy data streams vs adversarial concept drift. It is important to offer
a clear distinction between noisy data streams and adversarial concept drift.
The former cases assume that either some features or labels have been incor-
rectly measured or provided by annotators. They do not have any underlying
characteristics and usually come from additive random distributions or human
errors. They may misguide the training procedure, but there is no malicious
intent associated with them. Adversarial concept drift and associated poison-
ing attacks assume that there is a malicious party actively working against
our machine learning system. The injected poisoned data was designed and
crafted in such a way that will purposefully damage the classifier while avoid-
ing easy detection. Adversarial drift must be seen as a coordinated attempt to
disturb or completely shut down the system under attack. Negative impacts
of poisoning attacks will be discussed next.
Negative impact of adversarial concept drift. In order to offer a complex
and holistic view on the problem of adversarial concept drift, let us now dis-
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cuss the major difficulties imposed by such a phenomenon on the underlying
machine learning system:
– Forcing false and unnecessary adaptation. Data stream mining al-
gorithms, primarily detectors or adaptive classifiers, actively monitor the
characteristics of the stream and trigger changing the learning model when
newly arriving data differ from the previous concepts. Therefore, by inject-
ing an adversarial drift during the stable period of a data stream (when no
changes in data distributions are taking place), a false alarm will be raised.
The learning algorithm will be cheated into thinking that a drift is taking
place and will adapt to poisoned instances provided by the attacker. This
can be used by a malicious party to damage the accuracy of the system
at will, e.g., when two competitors are analyzing the same stream of data.
Unnecessary adaptation not only will reduce the accuracy of the classifier,
but also will consume precious computational resources and time, slowing
the system down (Zliobaite et al., 2015) or even paralyzing it completely
during the recovery after such an attack (Shaker and Hu¨llermeier, 2015).
– Impairing the adaptation process. Adversarial concept drift may also
be injected during the occurrence of a valid concept drift. If poisoning
instances are well-crafted, they will offer information contrary to the actual
changes in data. This will confuse any adaptive learning system, forcing
it to adapt to two completely opposing concepts. If the algorithm deals
with a high number of poisoned instances, this may lead to a complete
nullification of the adaptation process. Even under the assumption that
the adversarial concept is much smaller than the valid concept, it will still
significantly slow down the adaptation process. The speed of adaptation
to new data is of crucial importance and any tampering with it may result
in massive financial losses or staying behind the competition.
– Hindering label query process in partially labeled streams. In real-
life scenarios, one does not have access to fully labeled streams. As it is
impossible to obtain the ground truth for each newly arriving instance,
active learning is being used to select the most useful instances for the
label query (Lughofer, 2017). Obtaining labels is connected with budget
management (i.e., the monetary cost for paying the annotator or domain
expert) and time (i.e., how quickly the expert can label instance under the
consideration). Adversarial concept drift will produce a number of instances
that will pretend to be useful for the classifier (as they seem to originate
from a novel concept). Even if the domain expert will correctly identify
them as adversarial instances, the budget and time have already been spent.
Therefore, adversarial concept drift is particularly dangerous for partially
labeled streams, where it may force misuse of already scarce resources
(Zliobaite et al., 2015).
Taxonomy of adversarial concept drift. We have analyzed and understood
the unique nature of adversarial concept drift, the challenges connected with
its differentiation from a valid concept drift, and the negative impacts it may
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have on the learning algorithms. Let us now propose the first taxonomy of
poisoning attacks in the streaming scenario:
(a) Before drift (b) Valid drift (c) Second valid drift
Fig. 1: Accurate adaptation to valid concept drift.
(a) Before drift (b) Hindered adaptation (c) Overfitting
Fig. 2: Adversarial drift via instance-based poisoning attacks hinders (b) or
exaggerates (c) the adaptation process.
(a) Before drift (b) False adaptation (c) Lack of adaptation
Fig. 3: Adversarial drift via concept-based poisoning attacks critically mis-
guides (b) or completely nullifies (c) the adaptation process.
– Adversarial concept drift with instance-based poisoning attacks.
The first type assumes that the malicious party injects singular corrupted
instances into the stream. They may be corrupted original instances with
flipped labels or with modified feature values. Instance-based attacks are
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common when the attacker wants to test the robustness of the system and
still needs to learn about the distribution of data in the stream. Addi-
tionally, supplying independent poisoned instances, especially when done
from multiple sources, may be harder to detect that injecting a large num-
ber of instances at once. Such attacks, at lower rates, may be picked up by
noise/outlier detection techniques. However, these attacks will appear more
frequently than natural anomalies and will be crafted with malicious intent,
requiring dedicated methods to filter them out. Instance-based poisoning
attacks will not cause a false drift detection, but may significantly impair
the adaptation to the actual concept drift. Figure 1 depicts the correct
adaptation to a valid concept drift, while Figure 2 depicts the same scenario
with a hindered or exaggerated adaptation affected by the instance-based
poisoning attacks.
– Adversarial concept drift with concept-based poisoning attacks.
The second type assumes that the malicious party have crafted poisoned
instances that form a coherent concept. This can be seen as injecting an
adversarial distribution of data that fulfills the cluster and smoothness as-
sumptions. Therefore, now we must handle a difficult attack that will elude
any outlier/noise/novelty detection methods. With the concept-based poi-
soning attack, we may assume that the malicious party poses a significant
knowledge about the real data distributions and is able to craft such con-
cepts that are going to directly cause false alarms and conflicts with valid
concept drift. The effects of concept-based poisoning attacks are much
more significant that its instance-based counterparts and may result, if un-
detected, in significant harm to the learning system and increased recovery
times for rebuilding the model. Such attacks can both cause false drift
detection and hinder, critically misguide or even completely nullify, the
adaptation of the learning algorithm. Figure 1 depicts the correct adapta-
tion to a valid concept drift, while Figure 2 depicts the same scenario with
an incorrect adaptation thwarted by the concept-based poisoning attacks.
4 Robust Restricted Boltzmann Machine for adversarial drift
detection
In this section, we describe in detail the proposed concept drift detector, real-
ized as a trainable Restricted Boltzmann Machine with enhanced robustness
to adversarial instances.
Overview of the proposed method. We introduce a novel concept drift
detector that is characterized by an increased robustness to adversarial concept
drift, while maintaining high sensitivity to valid concept drift. It is realized
as a Restricted Boltzmann Machine with leveraged robustness via improved
online gradient calculation and extended energy function. It is a fully trainable
drift detector, capable of autonomous adaptation to the current state of the
stream and not relying on user-defined thresholds or statistical tests.
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4.1 Restricted Boltzmann Machine
Neural network architecture. Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBMs)
are a popular family of generative two-layered neural networks that are con-
structed using the v layer of V visible neurons and the h layer of H hidden
neurons:
v = [v1, · · · , vV ] ∈ {0, 1}V ,
h = [h1, · · · , hH ] ∈ {0, 1}H
(6)
As we deal with the task of supervised learning from data streams (as
defined in Section 2), we need to extend this two-layer RBM architecture with
the third, final z layer for class representation. It is implemented as a ”one-
hot” encoding, meaning that only a single neuron in z may activate at a given
moment (i.e., have value set to 1, while every other one has value set to 0). By
1z we denote the vector of RBM outputs with 1 returned by z-th neuron and
0 returned by all other ones. This allows to define z, known also as the class
layer or the softmax layer:
z = [z1, · · · , zZ ] ∈ 11, · · · ,1Z . (7)
This final, class layer uses the softmax function to estimate the probabilities
of activation of each neuron in z.
RBM assumes no connection between units in the same layer, which holds
for v, h, and z. Neurons in the visible layer v are connected with neurons in
the hidden layer h, and neurons in h are connected with those in the class
layer z. The weight assigned to a connection between the i-th visible neuron
vi and the j-th hidden neuron hj is denoted as wij , while the weight assigned
to a connection between the j-th hidden neuron hj and the k-th class neuron
zk is denoted as ujk. This allows us to define the RBM energy function:
E(v,h, z) = −
V∑
i=1
viai−
H∑
j=1
hjbj−
Z∑
k=1
zkck−
V∑
i=1
H∑
j=1
vihjwij−
H∑
j=1
Z∑
k=1
hjzkujk,
(8)
where ai, bj , and ck are biases introduced to v,h, and z respectively. Energy
formula E(·) for state [v,h, z] can be used to calculate the probability of RBM
of being in this state, using the Boltzmann distribution:
P (v,h, z) =
exp (−E(v,h, z))
F
, (9)
where F is a partition function allowing to normalize the probability P (v,h, z)
to 1.
RBM assumes that its hidden neurons in h are independent and work with
variables (features in the case of supervised learning) given by the visible layer
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v. The activation probability of the j-th given neuron hj can be calculated as
follows:
P (hj |v, z) = 1
1 + exp
(
−bj −
∑V
i=1 viwij −
∑Z
k=1 zkujk
)
= σ
(
bj +
V∑
i=1
viwij +
Z∑
k=1
zkujk
)
,
(10)
where σ(·) = 1/(1 + exp(−·)) stands for a sigmoid function.
The same assumption may be made for neurons in the visible layer v, when
values of neurons in the hidden layer h are known. This allows us to calculate
the activation probability of the i-th visible neuron as:
P (vi|h) = 1
1 + exp
(
−ai −
∑H
j=1 hjwij
) = σ
ai + H∑
j=1
hjwij
 , (11)
where one must note that given h, the activation probability of neurons in v
does not depend on z. The activation probability of class layer (i.e., decision
which class the object should be assigned to) is calculated using the softmax
function:
P (z = 1k|h) =
exp
(
−ck −
∑H
j=1 hjujk
)
∑Z
l=1 exp
(
−cl −
∑H
j=1 hjujl
) , (12)
where k ∈ [1, · · · , Z] and k 6= l.
RBM training procedure. As RBM is a neural network model, we may
train it using a cost function C(·) minimization with a selected gradient descent
method. RBM most commonly uses the negative log-likelihood of both external
layers v and z:
C(v, z) = − log (P (v, z)) . (13)
By taking each independent weight wij , we may calculate now its gradient of
the cost function:
∇C(wij) = δC(v, z)
δwij
=
∑
v,h,z
P (v,h, z)vihj −
∑
h
P (h|v, z)vihj . (14)
This equation allows us to calculate the cost function gradient for a single
instance. However, concept drift cannot be detected by analyzing individual
instances independently. If we would base our change detection on variations
induced by a single new instance, we would be highly sensitive to even the
smallest noise ratio. Therefore, the properties of the stream should be analyzed
over a batch of most recent instances. We propose to define RBM model for
learning on mini-batches of instances. For a mini-batch of n instances arriving
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in t time Mt = x
t
1, · · · , xtn, we can rewrite the gradient from Eq. 14 using
expected values:
δC(Mt)
δwij
= Emodel[vihj ]− Edata[vihj ], (15)
where Edata is the expected value over the current mini-batch of instances and
Emodel is the expected value from the current state of RBM. Of course, we
cannot trace directly the value of Emodel, therefore we must approximate it
using Contrastive Divergence with k Gibbs sampling steps to reconstruct the
input data (CD-k):
δC(Mt)
δwij
≈ Erecon[vihj ]− Edata[vihj ]. (16)
After processing the t-th mini-batch Mt, we can update the wights in RBM
using any gradient descent method as follows:
wt+1ij = w
t
ij − η (Erecon[vihj ]− Edata[vihj ]) , (17)
where η stands for the learning rate of the RBM neural network. The way to
update the ai, bj , and ck biases, as well as weights ujk is analogous to Eq. 17
and can be expressed as:
at+1i = a
t
i − η (Erecon[vi]− Edata[vi]) , (18)
bt+1j = b
t
j − η (Erecon[hj ]− Edata[hj ]) , (19)
ct+1k = c
t
k − η (Erecon[zk]− Edata[zk]) , (20)
ut+1jk = u
t
jk − η (Erecon[hjzk]− Edata[hjzk]) . (21)
4.2 Drift detection with Robust RBM
While RBM is a generative neural network model, we can use it as an explicit
drift detector. The RBM model store compressed characteristics of the distri-
bution of data it was trained on. Therefore, by using any similarity measure
between the information stored in RBM and properties of newly arrived in-
stances, one may evaluate if there are any changes in the distribution. This
allows us to use RBM as a drift detector, introducing our Restricted Boltzmann
Machine for Drift Detection (RBM-DD). Our RBM-DD model uses its similar-
ity measure for monitoring the state of the stream and the level to which the
newly arrived instances differ from the previous concepts. One should notice
that RBM-DD is a fully trainable drift detector, capable not only of capturing
the trends in a single evaluation measure (like most of drift detectors do), but
also of learning and adapting to the current state of the stream. This makes it a
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highly attractive approach for handling difficult and rapidly changing streams
where non-trainable drift detectors tend to fail.
Measuring data similarity. In order to evaluate the similarity of newly ar-
rived instances to old concepts stored in RBM-DD, we will use the reconstruc-
tion error. It is calculated for every instance independently in an online fashion,
by inputting a newly arrived d-dimensional instance Sn = [x
n
1 , · · · , xnd , yn] to
the v layer of RBM. Then values of neurons in v are calculated to reconstruct
the feature values. Finally, class layer z is activated and used to reconstruct
the class label. We can denote the reconstructed vector as:
S˜n = [x˜
n
1 , · · · , x˜nd , y˜n1 , · · · , y˜nZ ], (22)
where the reconstructed vector features and labels are taken from probabilities
calculated using the hidden layer:
x˜ni = P (vi|h), (23)
y˜nk = P (zk|h). (24)
The h layer is taken from the conditional probability, in which the v layer is
identical to the input instance:
h ∼ P (h|v = xn, z = 1yn). (25)
This allows us to write the reconstruction error in a form of the mean squared
error between the original and reconstructed instance:
R(Sn) =
√√√√ d∑
i=1
(xni − x˜ni )2 +
Z∑
k=1
(1ynk − y˜nk )2. (26)
For the purpose of a stable concept drift detector, we do not look for a
change in distribution over a single instance, but in a change of distribution
over the newly arriving batch of instances. Therefore, we need to calculate the
average reconstruction error over the recent mini-batch of data:
R(Mt) =
1
n
n∑
m=1
R(xtm). (27)
Adapting reconstruction error to drift detection. In order to make the
reconstruction error a practical measure for detecting the presence of concept
drift, we propose to measure the evolution of this measure (i.e., its trends) over
arriving mini-batches of instances. We achieve this by using the well-known
sliding window technique that will move over the arriving mini-batches. Let
us denote the trend of reconstruction error over time as Qr(t) and calculate it
using the following equation:
Qr(t) =
n¯tT¯Rt − T¯tR¯t
n¯tT¯ 2t − (T¯t)2
. (28)
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The trend over time can be computed using a simple linear regression, with
the terms in Eq. 28 being simply sums over time as follows:
T¯Rt = T¯Rt−1 + tR(Mt), (29)
T¯t = T¯t−1 + t, (30)
R¯t = R¯t−1 +R(Mt), (31)
T¯ 2t = T¯ 2t−1 + t2, (32)
where T¯R0 = 0, T¯0 = 0, R¯0 = 0, and T¯ 20 = 0. We capture those statistics
using a sliding window of size W . Instead of using a manually set size, which is
inefficient for drifting data streams, we propose to use a self-adaptive window
size (Bifet and Gavalda`, 2007). To allow flexible learning from various sizes of
mini-batches, we must consider a case where t > W . Here, we must compute
the terms for the trend regression using the following equations:
T¯Rt = T¯Rt−1 + tR(Mt)− (t− w)R(Mt−w), (33)
T¯t = T¯t−1 + t− (t− w), (34)
R¯t = R¯t−1 +R(Mt)−R(Mt−w), (35)
T¯ 2t = T¯ 2t−1 + t2 − (t− w)2. (36)
The required number of instances n¯t to compute the trend of Qr(t) as time t
is given as follows:
n¯t =
{
t if t ≤ w
w if t > w
(37)
Drift detection. The above Eq. 28 allows us to compute the trends for ev-
ery analyzed mini-batch of data. In order to detect the presence of drift we
need to have capability of checking if the new mini-batch differs significantly
from the previous one. Our RBM-DD achieves this by using Granger causality
test (Sun, 2008) on trends from subsequent mini-batches of data Qr(Mt) and
Qr(Mt+1). This is a statistical test that determines whether one trend is useful
in forecasting another. As we deal with non-stationary processes we perform
the variation of Granger causality test based on first differences (Mahjoub
et al., 2020). Accepted hypothesis means that it is assumed that there exist
Granger causality relationship between Qr(Mt) and Qr(Mt+1), which means
there is no concept drift. If the hypothesis is rejected, RBM-DD signals the
presence of concept drift.
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4.3 Introducing robustness to RBM
The previous section introduced our RBM-DD – a drift detection method
based on Restricted Boltzmann Machine. While this novel trainable drift de-
tector may offer a significant drift detection capabilities and adaptation to the
current state of the data stream, it offers no robustness to adversarial concept
drift. In this section, we discuss how to introduce robustness into RBM-DD,
leading to Robust Restricted Boltzmann Machine for Drift Detection (RRBM-
DD) that is capable of handling adversarial concept drift, while still displaying
sensitiveness to the emergence of valid drifts.
Robust gradient descent. The first weak point of the RBM-DD in the
adversarial scenario lies in its training phase. Adversarial instances may affect
the update of our trainable drift detector and thus make it less robust to
poisoning attacks over time. To avoid this, we propose to create RRBM-DD by
replacing the original online cost gradient calculation in RBM-DD (see Eq. 14)
used to update weights (see Eq. 17) by the robust gradient descent introduced
in (Holland and Ikeda, 2019). It postulates to rescale the instance values by
using a soft truncation of potentially adversarial instances. It achieves this
by using a class of M -estimators of location and scale. It introduces a robust
truncation factor θˆ to control the influence of adversarial instances during the
weight update:
wt+1ij = w
t
ij − η
(
Erecon[vihj ]− θˆiEdata[vihj ]
)
, (38)
where θˆi stands for the truncation factor for the i-th neuron in v (and thus
for the i-th input feature) that is calculated as follows:
θˆi ∈ arg min
θ∈R
n∑
a=1
ρ
(
Li(ya; z)− θ
si
)
, (39)
where ρ is a convex, even function and Li(ya; z) is a loss function between
true and predicted class labels (0-1 loss function is commonly used here). The
authors of the robust gradient descent (Holland and Ikeda, 2019) postulate
that for ρ(·) = ·2 the estimated truncation factor θˆi is reduced to the sample
mean of the loss function, thus alleviating the impact of extreme (in our case
adversarial) instances. Therefore, they recommend to take ρ(·) = o(·2) for the
function argument → ±∞.
The parameter si is a scaling factor used to ensure that consistent estimates
take place irrespective of the order of magnitude of the observations. It is
calculated as:
si = σˆi
√
n/ log(2δ−1), (40)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the confidence level and σˆi stands for an dispersion estimate
of the instances in the mini-batch:
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σˆi ∈
{
σ > 0 :
n∑
a=1
χ
(
Li(ya; z)− γi
σ
)
= 0
}
, (41)
where χ : R → R is an even function that satisfies χ(0) < 0 and χ(·) > 0 for
the function argument → ±∞. This ensures that σˆi is an adequate measure
of dispersion of the loss function about a pivot point γi =
∑n
a=1 Li(ya; z)/n
(Holland and Ikeda, 2019).
Analogously to Eq. 38, we use the robust truncation factor θˆ to update
remaining weights and parameters of RRBM-DD given by Eq. 18-21.
Robust energy function. Another weak spot of the RBM-DD lies in its
energy function (see Eq. 8). It is a crucial part for calculating the probability
of RBM-DD entering a given state and is used as the basis for the RBM-DD
training procedure. In our case, as we use RBM as a trainable drift detector,
energy function plays a crucial role in updating the detector with new instances
and adapting it to the current state of the stream. RBM-DD energy function
assumes working on clean (i.e., non-adversarial) data and thus can easily be
corrupted by any poisoning attacks. Therefore, we propose to improve it for
our RRBM-DD to alleviate its sensitivity to corrupted instances. We achieve
this by adding a gating step to the visible layer v, allowing for switching
on and off neurons that may be strongly affected by noise (i.e., coming from
adversarial sources). We add two new sets of variables: v˜ = [v˜1, · · · , v˜V ] that
stands for a Gaussian noise model for each neuron in the visible layer and
g = [g1, · · · , gV ] that stands for a binary gating function for each neuron.
This allows us to use gating to switch off neurons in v that have a chance
probability of being affected by noisy instances. As we train our RRBM-DD
over mini-batches of data, this approach will effectively switch off the RRBM-
DD training procedure for every new instance that is denoted as adversarial by
our underlying Gaussian noise model. The robust energy function for RRBM-
DD is expressed as follows:
ER(v, v˜,h, z,g) =
1
2
V∑
i=1
gi(vi − v˜i)2 −
V∑
i=1
viai −
H∑
j=1
hjbj −
Z∑
k=1
zkck
−
V∑
i=1
H∑
j=1
vihjwij −
H∑
j=1
Z∑
k=1
hjzkujk +
1
2
V∑
i=1
(v˜i − b˜i)2
σ˜2i
,
(42)
where the first (added) term stands for the gating interactions between vi and
v˜i, the original energy function models the clean data, the last (added) term
stands for the noise model, and b˜i and σ˜
2
i stands for mean and variance of
the noise. If RRBM-DD assumes that the i-th neuron in v is corrupted by the
adversarial instance (gi = 0) then v˜i ∼ N (v˜i|b˜i; σ˜2i ).
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4.4 Metric for evaluating robustness to poisoning attacks in streaming
scenarios
Concept drift detectors are commonly evaluated by the prequential accuracy
(Hidalgo et al., 2019) or prequential AUC/G-mean (Korycki et al., 2019) of the
underlying classifier. The reasoning behind it is that the better the detection of
drift offered by the evaluated algorithm, the faster and more accurate classifier
adaptation becomes. However, this set-up is not sufficient for evaluating drift
detectors in the adversarial concept drift setting. As we want to evaluate the
robustness of a drift detector to poisoning attacks, we should attack the data
stream with various levels of intensity to determine the breaking point of each
algorithm. However, simple evaluation of a performance metric over varying
levels of adversarial concept drift intensity does not give us information on
how much our algorithm deteriorates over increasingly poisoned data.
We assume that we evaluate the robustness of drift detectors in a controlled
experimental environment, where we can inject a desired level of adversarial
concept drift into any benchmark data stream. Let us denote by L = [l1, · · · , la]
the set of adversarial poisoning levels, ordered in the ascending order l1 < la
from the smallest to the highest level of adversarial drift injection. Following
the taxonomy introduced in Section 3, we can understand those levels as:
– for instance-based poisoning attacks – the percentage of instances in a
mini-batch considered as adversarial in the data stream,
– for concept-based poisoning attacks – the number of adversarial concepts
injected into the data stream.
Inspired by works in noisy data classification (Sa´ez et al., 2016), we intro-
duce a Relative Loss of Robustness (RLR) that compares the performance of
a given algorithm on a clean data stream against its performance on a data
stream with l-th level of adversarial concept drift injected:
RLRl =
M0 −Ml
M0
. (43)
This is a popular approach used to evaluate the impact of noise on classi-
fiers and can be directly adapted to the setting of adversarial drift detection.
While it offers a convenient measure over a single level of poisoning, it be-
comes increasingly difficult to use when we want to evaluate the robustness
of an algorithm over multiple poisoning levels. To alleviate this drawback, we
propose an aggregated version of RLR measure over all considered adversarial
poisoning levels:
RLR =
∑#L
l=1 ωlRLRl
#L
, (44)
where ωl is the importance weight associated to the performance on l-the
level of adversarial information introduced to data and
∑#L
l=1 ωl = 1. The
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weighting part allows the end-user to adjust the measurements accordingly to
the analyzed problem. If the user is interested only in the overall robustness of
a given method, then all weights can be set to 1/#L. However, if it becomes
crucial to select a drift detector that can perform the best even under the
high intensity of attacks, the user may assign higher weights to higher levels
of adversarial drift injection.
5 Experimental study
This experimental study was designed to evaluate the usefulness of the pro-
posed RRBM–DD and answer the following research questions:
RQ1: Does RRBM-DD algorithm offers improved robustness to adversarial
concept drift realized instance-based poisoning attacks?
RQ2: Does RRBM-DD algorithm offers improved robustness to adversarial
concept drift realized concept-based poisoning attacks?
RQ3: Is RRBM-DD capable of preserving its robust characteristics when deal-
ing with sparsely labeled data streams?
RQ4: What are the impacts of individual components of RRBM-DD on its
robustness to adversarial concept drift?
5.1 Data stream benchmarks
Table 1: Properties of artificial and real data stream benchmarks.
Abbr. Stream Instances Features Classes Drift
Artificial data streams
HYPI Hyperplane 1 000 000 10 2 incremental
LEDS LED 1 000 000 24 10 sudden
RBFG RBF 1 000 000 40 20 gradual
RBFS RBF 1 000 000 20 10 sudden
SEAG SEA 3 000 000 3 4 gradual
TRES RandomTree 2 000 000 10 6 sudden
Real data streams
ecbdl14 Protein Structure Prediction 9 600 000 631 2 mixed
higgs High-energy Physics Classification 4 954 752 28 2 unknown
IntelLab Intel Lab Sensors 2 313 153 6 58 mixed
iot IoT Botnet Attacks 7 062 606 115 11 mixed
kddcup KDD Intrusion Detection 3 107 709 41 24 mixed
susy Supersymmetric Particle Detection 2 305 347 18 2 unknown
For the purpose of evaluating the proposed RRBM-DD, we selected 12
benchmark data streams, six of which were generated artificially using MOA
environment (Bifet et al., 2010a) and other six being real-world data streams
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coming from various domains, such as security, physics, and proteomics. Such
a diverse mix allowed us to evaluate the effectiveness of RRBM-DD over a
plethora of scenarios. Using artificial data streams allows us to control the
specific nature of drift and where it occurs, while real-world streams offer
challenging problems that are characterized by a mix of different learning
difficulties. Properties of used data stream benchmarks are given in Table 1.
5.2 Experimental setup
Here, we will present the details of the experimental study design.
Injection of adversarial concept drift. As there are no real-world bench-
marks for adversarial concept drift, we will inject poisoning attacks into our
12 benchmark data streams with the following procedures:
– instance-based poisoning attacks are injected by corrupting a ratio
Linst ∈ {0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25} of randomly selected instances in the
stream by flipping their class labels to a randomly chosen another class.
– concept-based poisoning attacks are injected by generating a number
Lconc ∈ {10, 30, 50, 70, 100} of small artificial concepts of n = 250 instances
using corresponding MOA data generators.
Sparsely labeled data streams. For the experiment investigating the ro-
bustness under limited access to ground truth, we investigate the 12 benchmark
data streams with {5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%} of labeled instances.
Reference concept drift detectors. As reference methods to the proposed
RRBM-DD, we have selected five state of the art concept drift detectors: Early
Drift Detection Method (EDDM) (Baena-Garca et al., 2006), Exponentially
Weighted Moving Average for Concept Drift Detection (ECDD) (Ross et al.,
2012), Fast Hoeffding Drift Detection Method (FHDDM) (Pesaranghader and
Viktor, 2016), Reactive Drift Detection Method (RDDM) (de Barros et al.,
2017),and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Drift Detector (WSTD) (de Barros et al.,
2018). Parameters of all six drift detectors are given in Table 2.
Parameter tuning. To offer a fair and thorough comparison, we perform pa-
rameter tuning for every drift detector and for every data stream benchmark.
As we deal with a streaming scenario, we use self hyper-parameter tuning
(Veloso et al., 2018) that is based on online Nelder & Mead optimization.
Ablation study. In order to be able to answer RQ4 we perform an ablation
study to check the impact of individual introduced components on the robust-
ness of the drift detector. We compare RRBM–DD with its simplified versions
with only robust online gradient RBM–DDRG, only robust energy function
RBM–DDRE , and basic RBM–DD with no explicit robustness mechanisms.
Base classifier. To ensure fairness in comparison among examined drift de-
tectors they all use Adaptive Hoeffding Decision Tree (Bifet and Gavalda`,
2009) as a base classifier.
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Table 2: Examined drift detectors and their parameters.
Abbr. Name Parameters
EDDM Early Drift Detection warning threshold αw ∈ {0.90, 0.92, 0.95, 0.98}
drift threshold αd ∈ {0.80, 0.85, 0.90.0.95}
min. no. of errors e ∈ {10, 30, 50, 70}
ECDD EWMA for Drift Detection differentiation weights λ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4}
min. no. of errors n = {10, 30, 50, 70}
FHDDM Fast Hoeffding Drift Detection sliding window size ω ∈ {25, 50, 75, 100}
allowed error δ ∈ {0.000001, 0.00001, 0.0001, 0.001}
RDDM Reactive Drift Detection warning threshold αw ∈ {0.90, 0.92, 0.95, 0.98}
drift threshold αd ∈ {0.80, 0.85, 0.90.0.95}
min. no. of errors e ∈ {10, 30, 50, 70}
min. no. of instances min ∈ {3000, 5000, 7000, 9000}
max. no. of instances max ∈ {10000, 20000, 30000, 40000}
warning limit wL ∈ {800, 1000, 1200, 1400}
WSTD Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test sliding window size ω ∈ {25, 50, 75, 100}
Drift Detection warning significance αw ∈ {0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.07}
drift significance αd ∈ {0.001, 0.003, 0.005, 0.007}
max. no of old instances min ∈ {1000, 2000, 3000, 4000}
RRBM–DD Robust RBM Drift Detection mini–batch size M ∈ {25, 50, 75, 100}
visible neurons V = no. of features
hidden neurons H ∈ {0.25V, 0.5V, 0.75V,V}
class neurons Z = no. of classes
learning rate η ∈ {0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.07}
Gibbs sampling steps k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
robust gradient confidence δ ∈ {0.90, 0.92, 0.95, 0.98}
Evaluation metrics. As we deal with drifting data streams, we evaluated
examined algorithms using prequential accuracy (Hidalgo et al., 2019) and
the proposed RLR metric (see Eq. 44). RLR assumes equal weights assigned
to each level of adversarial drift injection.
Windows. We used a window size W = 1000 for window-based drift detectors
and calculating the prequential metrics .
Statistical analysis. We used the Friedman ranking test with Bonferroni-
Dunn post-hoc for determining statistical significance over multiple compar-
isons with significance level α = 0.05.
5.3 Experiment 1: Evaluating robustness to instance-based poisoning attacks
The first experiment was designed to evaluate the robustness of RRBM–DD
and reference drift detectors to instance-based poisoning attacks. For this pur-
pose, we injected five different ratios of poisoning attacks into 12 benchmark
data streams. Figure 4 depicts the effects of varying levels of adversarial con-
cept drift on the prequential accuracy of the underlying classifier, while Table 3
presents the RLR metric results. Additionally, Figures 5 and 6 show the vi-
sualizations of Friedman ranking test with Bonferroni-Dunn post-hoc on both
used metrics.
We can see how instance-based poisoning attacks impact both drift detec-
tors and the underlying classifier. For low attack ratios (0.05 and 0.10) we
already can observe drops in performance, but all of the examined methods
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Fig. 4: Relationship between prequential accuracy and ratio of injected adver-
sarial concept drift via instance-based poisoning attacks.
can still deliver acceptable performance. With the increase of poisoning attack
ratios, all reference drift detectors start to fail. They cannot cope with such
adversarial streams and are not able to select properly the moment for up-
dating the Adaptive Hoeffding Tree classifier. In many cases, the performance
starts to approach random decisions, which is a strong indicator of the neg-
ative effects that instance-based poisoning attacks have on detectors. This is
26  Lukasz Korycki, Bartosz Krawczyk†
Table 3: RLR for RRBM–DD and reference drift detectors under instance-
based poisoning attacks.
Stream EDDM ECDD FHDDM RDDM WSTD RRBM–DD
HYPI 0.55 0.58 0.67 0.64 0.63 0.85
LEDS 0.61 0.62 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.90
RBFG 0.54 0.55 0.58 0.56 0.61 0.77
RBFS 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.54 0.52 0.73
SEAG 0.67 0.71 0.70 0.74 0.77 0.86
TRES 0.44 0.43 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.72
ecbdl14 0.40 0.45 0.52 0.56 0.53 0.69
higgs 0.71 0.73 0.77 0.81 0.82 0.94
IntelLab 0.41 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.69
iot 0.73 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.95
kddcup 0.63 0.60 0.67 0.65 0.69 0.83
susy 0.65 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.73 0.85
avg. rank 5.88 4.12 3.73 3.22 3.05 1.00
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Fig. 5: The Bonferroni-Dunn test for comparison among drift detectors under
instance-based poisoning attacks, based on prequential accuracy.
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Fig. 6: The Bonferroni-Dunn test for comparison among drift detectors under
instance-based poisoning attacks, based on RLR.
especially visible in the case of EDDM and ECDD that are the weakest per-
forming ones. RRBM–DD outperforms every single competitor, especially for
RLR metric where it is the best algorithm over all 12 benchmarks. By analyz-
ing Figure 4 we can see that RRBM–DD offers significantly higher robustness
to increasing levels of adversarial concept drift. For not a single data stream
we can observe any sharp decline in performance, even when 25% of instances
in the stream are corrupted by the adversarial attacker. Such a situation can
be explained by the way standard drift detectors compute the presence of a
valid drift. They use statistics, such as mean values or errors, derived directly
from data. This makes them highly susceptible to any adversarial attack, as
even small corruption of the data being used to compute drift statistics will
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result in either incorrectly increased sensitivity to any variations in streams,
or inhibits sensitivity to valid concept drift. RRBM–DD avoids this pitfall by
being a fully trainable drift detector that uses two robustness inducing mecha-
nisms that filter data before it is updated. This allows RRBM–DD to compute
more accurate reconstruction error from mini-batches and use it to correctly
react only to valid concept drift.
RQ1 answer. Yes, RRBM–DD offers excellent robustness to instance-based
poisoning attacks and is not significantly affected by various levels of such
adversarial concept drift.
5.4 Experiment 2: Evaluating robustness to concept-based poisoning attacks
Experiment 2 was designed as a follow-up to Experiment 1. Here, we want
to investigate a much more challenging scenario of concept-based poisoning
attacks on data streams. For this purpose, we injected five different numbers
of adversarial concepts into 12 benchmark data streams. Figure 7 depicts the
effects of varying levels of adversarial concept drift on the prequential accuracy
of the underlying classifier, while Table 4 presents the RLR metric results.
Additionally, Figures 8 and 9 show the visualizations of Friedman ranking test
with Bonferroni-Dunn post-hoc on both used metrics.
Table 4: RLR for RRBM–DD and reference drift detectors under concept-
based poisoning attacks.
Stream EDDM ECDD FHDDM RDDM WSTD RRBM–DD
HYPI 0.44 0.45 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.78
LEDS 0.48 0.52 0.56 0.55 0.59 0.84
RBFG 0.35 0.38 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.71
RBFS 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.68
SEAG 0.51 0.55 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.82
TRES 0.22 0.20 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.63
ecbdl14 0.18 0.17 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.60
higgs 0.52 0.56 0.57 0.61 0.63 0.88
IntelLab 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.30 0.32 0.65
iot 0.63 0.65 0.69 0.71 0.74 0.90
kddcup 0.39 0.35 0.44 0.40 0.47 0.76
susy 0.42 0.45 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.80
avg. rank 5.60 4.55 3.10 3.90 2.95 1.00
Experiment 2 further confirms the observations made during the analysis
of experiment 1. State-of-the-art drift detectors offer no robustness to adver-
sarial attacks and can be very easily fooled or damaged by even a very small
number of poisoning attacks. What is very important to notice is the difference
in the impact of concept-based poisoning attacks versus their instance-based
counterparts. Here we can see the catastrophic effects of injecting adversarial
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Fig. 7: Relationship between prequential accuracy and number of injected
adversarial concept drift via concept-based poisoning attacks.
concepts into the stream, as every single reference drift detector converges at
a point where it behaves worse than a random guess. This can be interpreted
as adversarial data hijacking the updating process of the underlying classifier
and forcing it to adapt to the malicious information. RRBM–DD once again
offers excellent robustness, while maintaining a very good valid drift detection
– as evident from the high prequential accuracy of Adaptive Hoeffding Tree
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Fig. 8: The Bonferroni-Dunn test for comparison among drift detectors under
concept-based poisoning attacks, based on prequential accuracy.
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Fig. 9: The Bonferroni-Dunn test for comparison among drift detectors under
concept-based poisoning attacks, based on RLR.
associated with it. Of course, concept-based poisoning attacks have a stronger
effect on RRBM-DD, yet they are not capable of hindering its sensitivity and
robustness. The first two experiments highlighted the excellent properties of
RRBM-DD when dealing with adversarial concept drift, but it would be very
beneficial to understand what exactly is the cause of such a performance. We
will analyze this using an ablation study in experiment 4.
RQ2 answer. Yes, RRBM-DD can efficiently handle the injection of adver-
sarial concepts, even when they fulfill smoothness and cluster assumptions.
This proves that RRBM–DD is not simply insensitive to noisy data, but can
handle truly adversarial scenarios with malicious party using crafted poisoning
attacks on data.
5.5 Experiment 3: Evaluating robustness under class label sparsity
The third experiment was designed to investigate the behavior of RRDM–DD
under sparse access to class labels. As discussed in Sections 1 and 3 a common
pitfall of many algorithms for learning from data streams lies in the unrealistic
assumption that there is unlimited access to labeled instances. It is crucial
to acknowledge that any algorithm for data stream mining, be it classifier
or drift detector, must be flexible enough to work in scenarios where class
labels are sparse. We used 12 benchmark data streams to select six different
percentages of labeled instances. The label query procedure was repeated 10
times, in order to avoid impacting the results with selecting easy or difficult
instances. This resulted in 60 runs for each out of 12 benchmark streams.
Figures 10 and 11 present the win-tie-loss plots for comparing the performance
of RRBM–DD on sparsely labeled streams under instance-based and concept-
based poisoning attacks. Tables 5 and 6 present the RLR metrics for RRDM-
DD and reference methods under both types of attacks, while Figures 12 and 13
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show the visualizations of the Friedman ranking test with Bonferroni-Dunn
post-hoc analysis.
Table 5: RLR for RRBM–DD and reference drift detectors under instance-
based poisoning attacks and sparsely labeled data. Results averaged over all
labeling budgets, presented with standard deviation.
Stream EDDM ECDD FHDDM RDDM WSTD RRBM–DD
HYPI 0.47±0.11 0.49±0.10 0.61±0.12 0.55±0.16 0.57±0.13 0.80±0.08
LEDS 0.52±0.09 0.51±0.09 0.63±0.10 0.61±0.14 0.63±0.11 0.83±0.05
RBFG 0.40±0.16 0.42±0.12 0.47±0.09 0.45±0.15 0.50±0.11 0.69±0.09
RBFS 0.37±0.06 0.38±0.05 0.41±0.07 0.40±0.09 0.44±0.06 0.63±0.07
SEAG 0.56±0.12 0.62±0.09 0.59±0.09 0.57±0.14 0.66±0.10 0.81±0.08
TRES 0.30±0.05 0.32±0.04 0.35±0.06 0.32±0.08 0.38±0.08 0.63±0.04
ecbdl14 0.33±0.07 0.36±0.06 0.45±0.09 0.42±0.11 0.46±0.10 0.60±0.05
higgs 0.58±0.14 0.62±0.10 0.65±0.12 0.64±0.16 0.70±0.11 0.82±0.07
IntelLab 0.28±0.08 0.30±0.06 0.34±0.06 0.31±0.10 0.36±0.08 0.60±0.04
iot 0.65±0.09 0.68±0.06 0.72±0.07 0.71±0.11 0.77±0.10 0.88±0.07
kddcup 0.55±0.05 0.53±0.09 0.57±0.10 0.55±0.13 0.60±0.10 0.77±0.06
susy 0.60±0.11 0.63±0.08 0.67±0.09 0.65±0.13 0.68±0.13 0.79±0.07
avg. rank 5.17 4.55 4.13 3.25 2.90 1.00
Table 6: RLR for RRBM–DD and reference drift detectors under concept-
based poisoning attacks and sparsely labeled data. Results averaged over all
labeling budgets, presented with standard deviation.
Stream EDDM ECDD FHDDM RDDM WSTD RRBM–DD
HYPI 0.28±0.07 0.29±0.06 0.37±0.10 0.34±0.13 0.37±0.13 0.69±0.06
LEDS 0.25±0.05 0.32±0.05 0.44±0.08 0.41±0.10 0.46±0.08 0.75±0.07
RBFG 0.23±0.06 0.26±0.07 0.33±0.07 0.29±0.12 0.34±0.14 0.62±0.06
RBFS 0.18±0.04 0.19±0.06 0.20±0.04 0.18±0.05 0.22±0.04 0.59±0.04
SEAG 0.40±0.12 0.42±0.13 0.44±0.10 0.41±0.15 0.45±0.12 0.74±0.08
TRES 0.09±0.03 0.11±0.04 0.14±0.04 0.13±0.04 0.17±0.04 0.51±0.05
ecbdl14 0.08±0.02 0.07±0.02 0.11±0.02 0.09±0.03 0.13±0.02 0.48±0.05
higgs 0.39±0.10 0.40±0.08 0.44±0.11 0.41±0.13 0.48±0.15 0.79±0.08
IntelLab 0.12±0.04 0.14±0.04 0.16±0.05 0.13±0.05 0.18±0.04 0.58±0.09
iot 0.51±0.13 0.52±0.16 0.56±0.12 0.55±0.16 0.60±0.13 0.81±0.11
kddcup 0.23±0.03 0.20±0.05 0.24±0.05 0.19±0.05 0.28±0.03 0.68±0.05
susy 0.31±0.07 0.34±0.07 0.36±0.09 0.37±0.10 0.39±0.10 0.70±0.07
avg. rank 5.38 4.14 4.66 3.72 2.10 1.00
Sparse access to class labels significantly impacts state-of-the-art drift de-
tectors. All of them were designed for fully supervised cases and use both
feature values and class labels to compute statistics used in drift detection. By
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Fig. 10: Comparison of RRBM–DD with reference drift detectors under
instance-based poisoning attacks and sparsely labeled assumption (only 10%
labeled instances) with respect to the number of wins (green), ties (yellow),
and losses (red), according to a pairwise F-test with statistical significance
level α = 0.05. Prequential accuracy used as a metric. 60 runs per data stream
were obtained from 6 different labeling budgets, each repeated 10 times with
random selection of instances to be labeled.
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Fig. 11: Comparison of RRBM–DD with reference drift detectors under
concept-based poisoning attacks and sparsely labeled assumption with respect
to the number of wins (green), ties (yellow), and losses (red), according to a
pairwise F-test with statistical significance level α = 0.05. Prequential accu-
racy used as a metric. 60 runs per data stream were obtained from 6 different
labeling budgets, each repeated 10 times with random selection of instances
to be labeled.
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Fig. 12: The Bonferroni-Dunn test for comparison among drift detectors under
instance-based poisoning attacks and sparsely labeled data, based on RLR and
all examined labeling ratios.
1 2 3 4 5 6
RRBM-DD WSTD
RDDM
FHDDM
ECDD
EDDM
Fig. 13: The Bonferroni-Dunn test for comparison among drift detectors under
concept-based poisoning attacks and sparsely labeled data, based on RLR and
all examined labeling ratios.
limiting the number of labeled instances they obtain, the estimators of used
statistics become less and less reliable. Detectors are forced to make decisions
based on a small, potentially non-representative sample and thus are much
more prone to errors. This is already a very difficult problem, but becomes
even more challenging when combined with the presence of adversarial concept
drift. RRBM–DD, due to its trainable nature is capable of much better per-
formance even under limited access to class labels. As we track the progress of
the stream using regression-based trends, we can still compute them efficiently
from a smaller sample size. Furthermore, used robust gradient was designed
by its authors to work with smaller data streams (Holland and Ikeda, 2019).
RQ3 answer. Yes, RRBM-DD is capable of efficiently handling sparsely la-
beled data streams, without sacrificing its accuracy and robustness to adver-
sarial concept drift.
5.6 Experiment 4: Ablation study
The fourth and final experiment was designed in the form of ablation study.
Here, we want to switch off different components of RRBM–DD to gain un-
derstanding what is the source of its desirable performance and under what
specific scenarios which component offers the most improvement to our drift
detector. Tables 7 and 8 show the LRL metric performance averaged over fully
and sparsely labeled data streams for four settings – the proposed RRBM–DD
model, its basic version RBM–DD without any robustness enhancements (dis-
cussed in Section 4.1), RBM–DDRG using only robust gradient calculation and
RBM–DDRE using only robust energy function for estimating network state.
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Table 7: Ablation results for RRBM–DD according to RLR under instance-
based poisoning attacks. Results averaged over fully and sparsely labeled
benchmarks, presented with standard deviation.
Stream RBM-DD RBM–DDRG RBM–DDRE RRBM-DD
HYPI 0.58±0.10 0.77±0.09 0.64±0.09 0.82±0.09
LEDS 0.66±0.12 0.80±0.07 0.72±0.10 0.84±0.06
RBFG 0.52±0.11 0.66±0.09 0.59±0.10 0.72±0.09
RBFS 0.47±0.08 0.58±0.09 0.53±0.07 0.66±0.08
SEAG 0.68±0.11 0.78±0.10 0.74±0.10 0.82±0.10
TRES 0.41±0.10 0.59±0.06 0.48±0.08 0.65±0.05
ecbdl14 0.48±0.11 0.58±0.07 0.53±0.09 0.61±0.07
higgs 0.73±0.11 0.82±0.09 0.77±0.10 0.85±0.08
IntelLab 0.38±0.08 0.59±0.08 0.52±0.08 0.66±0.08
iot 0.77±0.10 0.86±0.05 0.83±0.08 0.90±0.05
kddcup 0.61±0.11 0.72±0.08 0.66±0.10 0.79±0.07
susy 0.70±0.12 0.80±0.09 0.73±0.09 0.83±0.09
avg. rank 4.00 2.05 2.95 1.00
Table 8: Ablation results for RRBM–DD according to RLR under concept-
based poisoning attacks. Results averaged over fully and sparsely labeled
benchmarks, presented with standard deviation.
Stream RBM-DD RBM–DDRG RBM–DDRE RRBM-DD
HYPI 0.38±0.11 0.44±0.10 0.65±0.06 0.72±0.07
LEDS 0.50±0.09 0.57±0.10 0.68±0.12 0.78±0.11
RBFG 0.36±0.15 0.45±0.11 0.56±0.07 0.64±0.08
RBFS 0.25±0.05 0.38±0.05 0.50±0.05 0.61±0.05
SEAG 0.43±0.10 0.57±0.11 0.68±0.10 0.78±0.10
TRES 0.16±0.04 0.31±0.06 0.42±0.09 0.55±0.08
ecbdl14 0.14±0.04 0.29±0.05 0.40±0.08 0.51±0.07
higgs 0.51±0.13 0.65±0.11 0.76±0.10 0.83±0.11
IntelLab 0.20±0.04 0.41±0.07 0.53±0.08 0.64±0.08
iot 0.64±0.13 0.69±0.12 0.74±0.10 0.83±0.11
kddcup 0.26±0.06 0.53±0.05 0.62±0.05 0.72±0.05
susy 0.37±0.11 0.50±0.09 0.63±0.07 0.75±0.08
avg. rank 4.00 2.90 2.10 1.00
The basic RBM–DD performs only slightly better than state-of-the-art
drift detectors. This shows that the excellent performance of RRBM–DD in
the face of adversarial concept drift cannot be only contributed to its trainable
nature or used neural model. One must notice that both gradient and energy
function of RRBM–DD offer significant improvements on their own, but in
specific conditions. Robust gradient offers a higher boost to robustness when
dealing with instance-based poisoning attacks. This can be explained by the
scaling approach used in it (see Eq. 39– 41), as it filters out instances that dif-
fer significantly from the core concept of each class. This makes it very robust
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to instance by instance attacks, as they will not affect significantly the training
procedure of RRBM–DD. On the other hand, the robust energy function (see
Eq. 42) offers much better performance when dealing with concept-based poi-
soning attacks. This can be contributed to the noise model that is embedded in
said function. It allows to model not instances but entire noisy distributions,
effectively cutting out adversarial concepts (i.e., disjuncts of instances) from
strongly impacting the weight update of RRBM-DD.
RQ4 answer. RRBM–DD benefits from interplay between both of its ro-
bustness enhancing components. They offer diverse, yet mutually complemen-
tary functionalities and their combination makes RRDM-DD robust to various
types of adversarial attacks.
6 Conclusions and future works
Summary. In this paper, we have presented a novel scenario of learning from
data streams under adversarial concept drift. We proposed that two types of
change may be present during the stream processing. Valid concept drift rep-
resents natural changes in the underlying data characteristics and must be
correctly detected in order to allow a smooth adaptation of the model. Ad-
versarial concept drift represents a poisoning attack from a malicious party
that aims at hindering or disabling the classification system. We discussed the
negative impacts of adversarial drift on classifiers and proposed a taxonomy of
two types of attacks: instance-based and concept-based. We examined state-
of-the-art concept drift detectors and concluded that none of them is capable
of handling adversarial instances. To address this challenging task we proposed
a novel approach that is robust to the presence of adversarial instances: Ro-
bust Restricted Boltzmann Machine Drift Detector. We presented how this
fully trainable neural model can be used for efficient tracking of trends in the
stream and accurate drift recognition. We enhanced our drift detector with the
improved gradient calculation method and energy function with an embedded
noise model. These modifications made our model robust to adversarial con-
cept drift, while still being sensitive to valid drifts. Finally, we have introduced
Relative Loss of Robustness, a novel measure for evaluating the performance
of drift detectors and other streaming algorithms under adversarial concept
drift.
Main conclusions. The efficacy of RRBM–DD was evaluated on the basis of
an extensive experimental study. The first two experiments compared RRBM–
DD with five state-of-the-art drift detectors under instance-based and concept-
based poisoning attacks. Obtained results clearly backed-up our observations
that none of the existing drift detectors displays robustness to adversarial in-
stances. RRBM–DD offered not only excellent detection rates of valid concept
drifts, but also high robustness to all types and intensity levels of adversarial
attacks. These characteristics were valid in both fully and sparsely labeled data
streams, making RRBM-DD a highly suitable algorithm for a plethora of real-
life applications. Finally, we have conducted an ablation study to understand
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the impact of RRBM-DD components on its robustness. Interestingly, both
components were useful in specific tasks. The robust gradient algorithm was
contributing most when dealing with instance-based poisoning attacks, while
robust energy function offered significant gains for RRBM-DD when handling
concept-based poisoning attacks.
Future works. RRBM–DD opens several directions for future research. We
plan to modify its cost functions in order to tackle the issue of simultaneous
adversarial concept drift and dynamic class imbalance, as well as develop deep
architectures based on RRBM–DD.
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